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I N D E X

ADDENDUM TO DOCUMENT BOOK

Document No.	Description
M 116	Report of interview with Hess by Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton, 11 May 1941. GB264
M 117	Record of interview with Hess, 13 May 1941. GB270
M 118	do, do. 14 May 1941. GB271
M 119	Record of conversation with Hess, 15 May 1941. GB272
M 120	"The VDA and the Nazi Party" (Extract from Germany Basic Handbook, Part III Chap.IV para.4, p.76)
M 121	"Deutsches Auslands-Institut" (Extract from Germany Basic Handbook, Part III, Chap.IV para.5(1) p.77)
M 122	"The Problem of German Minorities" (Extract from Germany Basic Handbook, Part III, Chap.IV, para.B.1. p.79) GB 264

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GB269

Secret

M 116

Report on Interview with Herr Hess by Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton on Sunday, 11th May, 1941.

At dusk on Saturday 10th May while Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton was on duty in the Turnhouse Sector Operations Rooms an enemy aircraft was plotted off the coast of Northumberland at 2208 hours and made a landfall close to Farne Islands. The Wing Commander received a report from the Observer Corps that the enemy aircraft was an Me. 110, which he thought a mistaken identification as this fighter type of aircraft had only once before been seen as far north as Northumberland (On August 15), and without extra fuel tanks could not make return flight.

The enemy aircraft flew west and at 2256 hours was plotted as flying north-east 3,000' over Ardrossan. Plots turned south and then north and again round to west when they finally faded a few miles south of Glasgow at 2307 hours.

Normal action had been taken to intercept and shoot down the enemy aircraft. A few minutes after plots faded an A.A.Site reported that an aircraft had crashed in flames. A Defiant fighter in hot pursuit was approximately 4 miles away and it was with disappointment that the Wing Commander learnt that its guns had not been fired. Later it was reported that the enemy aircraft had crashed two miles from Eaglesham close to the Mearns Road and that it was definitely an Me.110. A German having baled out had been captured.

The German prisoner gave his name as Alfred Horn and stated to the Home Guard and Police that he was on a "special mission" to see the Duke of Hamilton and had intended to land at Dungavel. Where the crash occurred is 12 miles from Dungavel in the constituency of East Renfrewshire, which the Duke of Hamilton represented for over nine years and where he was well known.

On being given this information the Wing Commander arranged to accompany the official Interrogating Officer to the place where the prisoner was confined.

Personal report by Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton

On Sunday 11th May at 10.00 hours I arrived at Maryhill Barracks with the Interrogating Officer, who first examined the effects of prisoner. These included Leica camera, photographs of himself and small boy and some medicines, also visiting cards of Dr. Karl Haushofer and his son, Dr.Albrecht Haushofer.

I entered the room of the prisoner accompanied by the Interrogating Officer and the Military Officer on guard.

The prisoner, who I had no recollection of ever having seen before, at once requested that I should speak to him alone. I then asked the other officers to withdraw, which they did.

The German opened by saying that he had seen me in Berlin at the Olympic Games in 1936 and that I had lunched in his house. He said, "I do not know if you recognise me but I am Rudolph Hess." He went on to say that he was on a mission of humanity and that the Fuhrer did not want to defeat England and wished to stop fighting. His friend Albrecht Haushofer, had told him that I was an Englishman who, he thought, would understand his(Hess's) point of view. He had consequently tried to arrange a meeting with me in Lisbon (see Haushofer's letter to me dated September 23rd, 1940). Hess went on to say that he had tried to fly to Dungavel and this was the fourth time he had set out, the first time being in December. On the three previous occasions he had turned back owing to bad weather. He had not attempted to make this journey during the time when Britain was gaining victories in Libya, as he thought his mission then might be interpreted as weakness, but now that Germany had gained successes in North Africa and Greece, he was glad to come.

The fact that Reich Minister, Hess, had come to this country in person

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would, he stated, show his sincerity and Germany's willingness for peace. He went on to say that the Fuhrer was convinced that Germany would win the war, possibly soon but certainly in one, two or three years. He wanted to stop the unnecessary slaughter that would otherwise inevitably take place. He asked me if I could get together leading members of my party to talk over things with a view to making peace proposals. I replied that there was now only one party in this country. He then said he could tell me what Hitler's peace terms would be. First, he would insist on an arrangement whereby our two countries would never go to war again. I questioned him as to how that arrangement could be brought about, and he replied that one of the conditions, of course, is that Britain would give up her traditional policy of always opposing the strongest power in Europe. I then told him that if we made peace now, we would be at war again certainly within two years. He asked why, to which Ireplied that if a peace agreement was possible the arrangement could have been made before the war started, but since, however, Germany chose war in preference to peace at a time when we were most anxious to preserve peace, I could put forward no hope o. a peace agreement now.

He requested me to ask the King to give him "parole", as he had come unarmed and of his own free will.

He further asked me if I could inform his family that he was safe by sending a telegram to Rothacker, Hertzog Stra.,17 Zurich, stating that Alfred Horn was in good health. He also asked that his identity should not be disclosed to the Press.

Throughout the interview, Hess was able to express himself fairly clearly, but he did not properly understand what I was saying and I suggested that I should return with an interpreter and have further conversation with him.

From Press photographs and Albrecht Haushofer's description of Hess, I believed that this prisoner was indeed Hess himself. Until this interview I had not the slightest idea that the invitation in Haushofer's letter to meet him (Haushofer) in Lisbon had any connection at all with Hess.

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M 117

SECRET

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH HERR RUDOLPH HESS

(May 13)

Hess started by saying that he must go back a long way in order to explain the chain of circumstances which had lead to his present decision.

Its origin lay in an English book called "England's Foreign Policy under Edward VII". The author of this book, who was an impartial and reputable historian, admitted that from 1904 on England's policy had been to oppose Germany and to back France. In the certain knowledge that this would lead to a conflict with Germany. Thus England was responsible for the war of 1914.

After the war came the Treaty of Versailles and the failure of the British Government to accord to the democratic system in Germany those concessions which would have enabled it to live. Hence the rise of Hitler and National Socialism.

In 1938, Hitler, after exhausting all peaceful means, was compelled to occupy Austria in conformity with the wishes of the Austrian people.

The Czechoslovak crisis was caused by the French determination, expressed by the French Air Minister, Monsieur Cot, to make Czechoslovakia an air base against Germany. It was Hitler's duty to scotch this plot. The intervention of Mr. Chamberlain and the Munich Conference had been a source of great relief to Hitler. About a fortnight after Munich, however, Mr. Chamberlain had publicly declared that he had only agreed to Munich in order to gain time for England's rearmament. Subsequently the British and French Governments had endeavoured to arm the rump state of Czechoslovakia against Germany. Herr Hitler could not stand this and acted just as any British Government would have done.

The Polish crisis was caused by England's determination to oppose Germany, the strongest power on the Continent. The German Government now knew from captured documents and statements of Poles that the Polish Government would have accepted the German proposals but for the efforts of the British Government to prevent a solution on these lines.

The British designs on Norway justified Hitler's attack on Norway and Denmark; and documents, which proved our intention to invade Germany through Holland and Belgium, justified the attack on the Low Countries.

The conclusion was clear that England was responsible for the present war. After the Polish collapse, Hitler had made a peace offer to France and Britain which had been rejected with scorn. Again, after the collapse of France, he had made another peace offer; and this too had been rejected. There was nothing further for Hitler to do but to pursue the struggle to its logical conclusion.

After this preliminary survey of past history on the lines of Hitler's speeche Herr Hess proceeded to the second part of his discourse, which was intended to prove that Germany must win the war.

He said that German aircraft production was enormous; much larger than that of Great Britain and America combined. The Germans knew all about U.S. production and a good deal about ours. They did not fear U.S. aircraft. Fast training schemes were in hand and the next few months would see a noticeable expansion in the German Air Force. At present numbers of trained pilots and completed machines were not even being used. Losses had been light, far lighter than had been anticipated. Whatever efforts Great Britain might make she would never

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alter the present proportion between the German and British Air Forces. When, in May last year, Great Britain started bombing Germany, Herr Hitler had believed that this was a momentary aberration; and, with exemplary patience, he had waited, partly so as to spare the world the horrors of unrestricted air warfare, and partly out of a sentimental regard for English culture and English monuments. It was only with the greatest reluctance that, after many weeks of waiting, he had given the order to bomb England.

As regards the Battle of the Atlantic, submarines were now being constructed in large numbers all over Germany. Submarine parts were even being built in occupied territory and the waterways of Germany were being used to transport the parts for assembly on the coast. Along some waterways completed submarines were being delivered to be commissioned. At the same time, crews were being trained on a huge scale. We must, therefore, expect that very shortly we should have to deal with a vastly increased number of submarines, working in co-operation with aircraft against our shipping.

As regards raw materials, Germany had acquired enormous resources in occupied territory. For example, in France alone they had captured thousands of barrels for anti-aircraft guns, which were now being adapted for German anti-aircraft units. Oil and raw materials were available in abundance. The only embarrassing shortage was the shortage of fat, and this was being overcome by various expedients.

Finally, there was not the slightest hope of bringing about a revolution in Germany. Hitler possesses the blindest confidence of the German masses.

The third and shortest part of the discourse was devoted to the reasons which had brought him here and the proposals which he had to make. He said that horrified at the prospect of the prolongation of the struggle, he had come here without the knowledge of Hitler in order to convince responsible persons that since England could not win the war, the wisest course was to make peace now. From a long and intimate knowledge of the Fuhrer which had begun eighteen years ago in the fortress of Landsberg, he could give his word of honour that the Fuhrer had never entertained any designs against the British Empire. Nor had he ever aspired to world domination. He believed that Germany's sphere of interest was in Europe and that any dissipation of Germany's strength beyond Europe's frontiers would be a weakness and would carry with it the seeds of Germany's destruction. Hitler would sincerely regret the collapse of the British Empire. At this point Hess tried to make my flesh creep by emphasising that the avaricious Americans had fell designs on the Empire. Canada would certainly be incorporated in the U.S.

Reverting to Hitler's attitude, he said that only as recently as May 3rd after his Reichstag speech, Hitler had declared to him that he had no oppressive demands to make of England.

The solution which Herr Hess proposed was that England should give Germany a free hand in Europe, and Germany would give England a completely free hand in the Empire, with the sole reservation that we should return Germany's ex-colonies, which she required as a source of raw materials. I asked, in order to draw him on the subject of Hitler's attitude to Russia, whether he included Russia in Europe or in Asia. He replied "In Asia". I then retorted that under the terms of his proposal, since Germany would only have a free hand in Europe, she would not be at liberty to attack Russia. Herr Hess reacted quickly by remarking that Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which would have to be satisfied, either by negotiation or as the result of a war. He added, however, that there was no foundation for the rumours now being spread that Hitler was contemplating an early attack on Russia.

I then asked about Italian aims and he said that he did not know them. I replied that it was a matter of some importance. He brushed this aside and

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said that he was sure that Italy's claims would not be excessive. I suggested that Italy scarcely deserved anything, but he begged to differ. Italy had rendered considerable services to Germany, and besides England had compensated defeated nations like Rumania after the last war.

Finally, as we were leaving the room, Herr Hess delivered a parting shot. He had forgotten, he declared, to emphasise that the proposal could only be considered on the understanding that it was negotiated by Germany with an English Government other than the present British Government. Mr. Churchill, who had planned the war since 1936, and his colleagues who had lent themselves to his war policy, were not persons with whom the Fuhrer could negotiate.

The above statement took about two hours and a quarter to make. At intervals I made a mild protest against some of Herr Hess's more ludicrous statements; and I occasionally threw a fly over him in order to induce him to develop a point which seemed of interest. But, in general, I allowed even the most outrageous remarks to pass unanswered, since I realised that argument would be quite fruitless and would certainly have deprived us of our breakfast.

4144)

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CB 271
Cited
Hyde

M 118

RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH HERR HESS ON MAY 14th

We started by asking Herr Hess how he was. He replied that he was feeling better. A number of complaints which he had had to make about his treatment had been remedied. In particular he had objected to being under the constant supervision of a private soldier. He also had a number of small requests to make, namely, the loan of certain books including "Three Men in a Boat", the return of his drugs, the return of his camera and a piece of his aeroplane as a souvenir. The Duke of Hamilton said that he would make enquiries as to the possibility of giving him satisfaction on these points.

Herr Hess then passed to an account of his flight. He said he had left Augsberg at 5.45 p.m. and on arrival off the coast of Scotland had found it too light to fly inland. He had then circled for an hour and a half over the North Sea, until he judged that it had become dark enough to cross the coast. He described at length the difficulty he had had in leaving his machine. On two occasions he became unconscious, the second time being after pulling the ripcord of his parachute. He was still unconscious when he reached the ground. He had been very well treated by the farmer on whose land he had come down, but he had been painfully surprised to be lodged in a common cell at Glasgow.

He then passed to political questions. He said that, on reflection, he had omitted to explain that there were two further conditions attached to his peace proposals. First, Germany could not leave Iraq in the lurch. The Iraqis had fought for Germany and Germany would, therefore, ha to require us to evacuate Iraq. I observed that this was going considerably beyond the original proposal that German interests should be confined to Europe, but he retorted that, taken as a whole, his proposals were more than fair. The second condition was that the peace agreement should contain a provision for the reciprocal indemnification of British and German nationals, whose property had been expropriated as the result of war.

Herr Hess concluded by saying that he wished to impress on us that Germany must win the war by blockade. We had no conception of the number of submarines now building in Germany. Hitler always did things on a grand scale and devastating submarine war, supported by new types of aircraft, would very shortly succeed in establishing a completely effective blockade of England It was fruitless for anyone here to imagine that England could capitulate and that the war could be waged from the Empire. It was Hitler's intention, in such an eventuality, to continue the blockade of England, even though the island had capitulated, so that we would have to face the deliberate starvation of the population of these islands. I observed that so far as the actual maintenance of life was concerned, we should probably not require very much shipping, but Herr Hess replied that the German blockade would be so effective that it would not be possible for us to run the blockade even with one or two ships a day.

As we were leaving he said that if conversations were initiated, as he hoped, he trusted that a qualified interpreter would be provided and that the conversations would not be attended by a large number of persons. As a Reich Minister he could not place himself in the position of being a lone individual subjected to a cross fire of comment and questions from a large number of persons.

15th May, 1941.

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GB 272

M 119

Record of a Conversation with Herr Hess on May 15th, 1941.

Herr Hess started by making various small complaints and requests. The guard made too much noise at night, might he have certain books etc., etc. I said I would do what I could on all these points.

I then said I had been surprised at his remarks the previous day about Iraq. He replied that he was not acquainted with the details of our relations with or treaty rights in Iraq. All he had meant to say was that since Iraq had fought for Germany, Hitler would have to take account of this fact in any peace settlement.

I then threw a fly over him about Ireland. He said that in all his talks with Hitler, the subject of Ireland had never been mentioned except incidentally. Ireland had done nothing for Germany in this war and it was therefore to be supposed that Hitler would not concern himself in Anglo-Irish relations. We had some little conversation about the difficulty of reconciling the wishes of the South and North and from this we passed to American interest in Ireland and so to America.

On the subject of America Hess took the following line.

1. The Germans reckoned with American intervention and were not afraid of it. They knew all about American aircraft production and the quality of the aircraft. Germany could outbuild England and America combined.
2. Germany had no designs on America. The so-called German peril was a ludicrous figment of imagination. Hitler's interests were European.
3. If we made peace now, America would be furious. America really wanted to inherit the British Empire.

Hess concluded by saying that Hitler really wanted a permanent understanding with us on a basis which preserved the Empire intact. His own flight was intended to give us a chance of opening conversations without loss of prestige. If we rejected this chance, it would be clear proof that we desired no understanding with Germany and Hitler would be entitled - in fact it would be his duty - to destroy us utterly and to keep us after the war in a state of permanent subjection.

If conversations were started, as he hoped, he would like the assistance of:-

Doctor E. Semelbauer, No. 43125) Huyton Camp,
Kurt Haass, No. 44012) near Liverpool.

also one German stenographer (from a camp) and one typist. He also hoped he would be told beforehand with whom he would have to negotiate and that it would not be with people who had taken a leading part in the war agitation against Germany.

Generally speaking, it was difficult to get him to talk politics. He thinks he has told me all he has to say and wishes to use me principally as a channel of complaint. In particular he objects to be closely guarded. He says he came here at great risk to himself and having got here safely has no intention of trying to run away or commit suicide.

(Initialled) I.A.K.

(4086)

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M 120

Extract from "German Basic Handbook"

Part III Chapter IV Paraph 4.
"The VDA and the Nazi Party, Page 76.

Under cover of independence, an all-out propaganda campaign, concerning the situation and conditions of German minorities abroad, was launched during the years 1933 to 1938, to prepare the German people by leaflets, pictorial publications, charts, population maps, and bulky volumes, for future aggression. "Every third German lives outside the border", was the most popular slogan. To arrive at this figure it was necessary to include "ten to twelve million overseas Germans in the United States", 2,860,000 in Switzerland, and 250,000 in Luxembourg. The same pamphlet, of which 300,000 copies were distributed, stated with regard to Denmark:-

> "Denmark; 60,000. Among them 50,000 in the lost North Schleswig. Our racial comrades in lost land. They have to preserve themselves in violent economic and cultural struggles. This is done mainly by the creation of excellent schools and libraries. The VDA's work in the separate areas of North Schleswig has been a great blessing during recent years. The number of German schools rose from 9 to 20; the number of German pupils from 249 to 815; the number of teachers from 17 to 49."

The farce of independence was dropped after the annexation of Austria, and special duties have since been assigned to the VDA in all annexed areas. In December 1938 the famous geo-politician, Professor Haushofer, teacher of Rudolf Hess, was made President of the VDA in place of Steinacher. It was, however, not revealed until January 1944 that for some time SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Verner Lorenz had been the President of the organisation. The date of his appointment cannot be established, but it is most probable that Haushofer was ousted after Hess's flight to England.

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Extract from "Germany Basic Handbook, Part III, Chapter IV. para. 5(1) "Deutsches Auslands-Institut, page 77.

The Department for Emigration was attached to the Re-emigration Office of the AO. It acted as a labour exchange for German workers seeking employment abroad. Its training school not only trained all future leaders of the AO, of the ethnic groups and of the VDA, but also younger members of the diplomatic and consular services. This department also selected the curricula of the many Schulungslager (indoctrination camps) for Germans abroad, acting as intermediary between the German government, which ran the camps, and persons who attended them. How it served the cause of German espionage can be gathered from a circular letter sent out by the Kameradschaft USA in January 1941 which called for:-

> "The collection of pictures, photos, handbills, pamphlets, newspaper clippings and posters of the German national movement in the USA, which began in the spring of 1939, will be continued.
>
> The material.....is to be built up to a complete collection, which later is to be incorporated into the DAI, as well as the central archives of the NSDAP in Munich, as an eternal record of our struggle in the United States." +

The address of the Kameradschaft USA was Stuttgart, Danziger Freiheit 17, which is that of the DAI headquarters.

+ "Mitteilungen der Kameradschaft USA", No.1, January 1941, page 6. The issue is prefaced by the words: "This communication is confidential. It is intended exclusively for the members of the Comradeship U.S.A. Any violation of this rule will result in the suspension of the circular letter."

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M. 122.

EXTRACT FROM "GERMANY BASIC HANDBOOK PART III CHAPTER IV. PARA B. 1. THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN MINORITIES Page 79.

Hitler's racial policy and the vast propaganda machine which was unleashed by this multitude of organisations soon became a menace to the whole of Europe. The creation of fifth columns in all states where German colonies or German minorities were settled was not only the work of such organisations as the A.O. or the VDA, but also of the minority leaders. They collaborated (often without the knowledge of most of their members) with the agents of the Gestapo and of German espionage. The cumulative effect of their propaganda, their persuasive arguments, lavish hospitality, bribery and threats, was generally decisive. It was the task of the AO, in conjunction with other German agencies, to disrupt the political forces of countries where there were no German minorities in strength, countries such as Holland, Belgium, Norway and France. It was the task of the German minorities, together with representatives of the AO and forces in opposition to the existing regime (fascist organisations, other non-German minorities), to disrupt the Easternand South Eastern European states. "One of the main causes of the rapid Polish collapse was the perfection with which the extensive espionage system of the German minority in Poland carried out its functions. Numerous short-wave transmitters kept the German Army Command continually informed," said a leading Swiss military expert+

+ Colonel Bircher's lecture on the Polish campaign, reported in "Neue Zurcher Zeitung." March 7th 1940.